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Providing financial incentives contingent on healthy behaviours is one way to encourage 18 
healthy behaviours. However, there remains substantial concerns with the acceptability of 19 
health promoting financial incentives (HPFI). Previous research has studied acceptability of 20 
HPFI to the public, recipients and practitioners. We are not aware of any previous work that 21 
has focused particularly on the views of public health policymakers.  22 
Our aim was to explore the views of public health policymakers on whether or not HPFI are 23 
acceptable; and what, if anything, could be done to maximise acceptability of HPFI. 24 
Methods 25 
We recruited 21 local, regional and national policymakers working in England via 26 
gatekeepers and snowballing. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 27 
participants exploring experiences of, and attitudes towards, HPFI. We analysed data using 28 
the Framework approach. 29 
Results 30 
Public health policymakers working in England acknowledged that HPFI could be a useful 31 
behaviour change tool, but were not overwhelmingly supportive of them. In particular, they 32 
raised concerns about effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, potential ‘gaming’, and whether 33 
or not HPFI address the underlying causes of unhealthy behaviours. Shopping voucher 34 
rewards, of smaller value, targeted at deprived groups were particularly acceptable to 35 
policymakers. Participants were particularly concerned about the response of other 36 
stakeholders to HPFI – including the public, potential recipients, politicians and the media. 37 
Overall, the interviews reflected three tensions. Firstly, a tension between wanting to trust 38 
individuals and promote responsibility; and distrust around the potential for ‘gaming the 39 
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system’. Secondly, a tension between participants’ own views about HPFI; and their concerns 40 
about the possible views of other stakeholders. Thirdly, a tension between participants’ 41 
personal distaste of HPFI; and their professional view that they could be a valuable behaviour 42 
change tool. 43 
Conclusions 44 
There are aspects of design that influence acceptability of financial incentive interventions to 45 
public health policymakers. However, it is not clear that even interventions designed to 46 
maximise acceptability would be acceptable enough to be recommended for implementation. 47 
Further work may be required to help policymakers understand the potential responses of 48 
other stakeholder groups to financial incentive interventions. 49 
Keywords: motivation; administrative personnel; health behaviour; qualitative research  50 




Engaging in health promoting behaviours helps reduce morbidity and mortality with 52 
subsequent social, healthcare and economic benefits. Despite ongoing efforts to encourage 53 
uptake of healthy behaviours, unhealthy behaviours remain common worldwide.[1] Providing 54 
financial incentives contingent on healthy behaviours is one method to encourage these 55 
behaviours. Health promoting financial incentives (HPFI) have been defined as cash or cash-56 
like rewards or penalties provided directly to individuals contingent on their performance of 57 
healthy behaviours.[2] 58 
A number of systematic, and other, reviews support the use of HPFI.[3-11] Non-systematic 59 
reviews have reported that HPFI are more effective for ‘one off’ behaviours such as attending 60 
for screening and vaccination, than more complex behaviours such as smoking cessation.[5, 61 
7] However, this is not confirmed in systematic reviews. Systematic reviews find that the 62 
effects of HPFI do not vary according to incentive value or target behaviour, but may be 63 
larger in more deprived groups.[3, 4]  Whilst these systematic reviews find prolonged effects 64 
of continuing incentives, effects after intervention removal appear to decrease over time – 65 
although not necessarily to extinction.[3, 4, 11]  66 
Despite this evidence of effect, the acceptability of HPFI has been questioned and they have 67 
been criticized as unethical, unfair and socially divisive.[12, 13] Acceptability of public 68 
health interventions can be considered from the point of view of a number of stakeholders. In 69 
the context of HPFI, these include policymakers responsible for intervention development, 70 
those responsible for intervention delivery, the public who may finance interventions through 71 
taxation, and potential recipients. All of these groups must be willing and able to engage with 72 
HPFI if they are to be widely implemented and their potential as behaviour change 73 
interventions exploited.[14]  74 
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In a recent systematic review on the acceptability of HPFI,[15] 22 empirical studies were 75 
identified. Most of these (17 of 22) were conducted with members of the public. Four studies 76 
in the review captured the views of clinicians and other practitioners working with those who 77 
received incentives.[16-19] These studies show some belief that HPFI can be effective, but 78 
also highlighted concerns around the ethics of offering rewards – although the specifics of 79 
these are not well described. Whilst one study included a small number of policymakers 80 
within their sample (n=3 out of 30),[19] we are not aware of any study that has specifically 81 
focused on the views of public health policymakers and decision-makers towards HPFI.  82 
The views of public health policymakers and decision-makers on HPFI may be particularly 83 
important as these individuals are likely to play key roles in recommending, or not, HPFI at a 84 
national level, and commissioning such interventions at a local level. Understanding their 85 
views on whether or not HPFI are appropriate interventions, and barriers and facilitators to 86 
implementation, is important for developing strategies to maximise the potential of HPFI. 87 
The aim of this research was, therefore, to explore the views of public health policymakers 88 
and decision-makers working in England, on whether or not HPFI interventions are 89 
acceptable; and what, if anything, could be done to maximise acceptability of HPFI. 90 
METHODS 91 
We conducted a qualitative interview study with public health policymakers and decision-92 
makers (referred to as ‘policymakers’ throughout) working in England. Ethical approval was 93 
provided by Newcastle University’s Faculty of Medical Sciences Ethics Committee 94 
(Approval Number: 00864; May 2015). We did not collect consent to share data widely and 95 
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data will not be made available. The paper is reported in accordance with the Consolidated 96 
Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research.[20] 97 
Participants 98 
We recruited individuals working in positions where they could influence and make decisions 99 
concerning the commissioning or strategic direction of local, regional and national public 100 
health improvement services in England. Sampling was purposive and we aimed to recruit at 101 
least six individuals working at each of the local, regional and national levels. We focused on 102 
England, as public health services are organised differently in other parts of the UK. 103 
Recruitment 104 
Participants were identified through key informants and via ‘snowballing’ – that is, asking 105 
recruited participants to suggest others who met the inclusion criteria and might be interested 106 
in taking part in the research. We purposively selected additional participants from amongst 107 
those suggested via ‘snowballing’ to achieve our intended sample mix. 108 
Potential participants were contacted by letter or email to introduce the study and provide a 109 
participant information sheet. Follow up phone calls allowed potential participants to ask 110 
questions and make arrangements for interviews. Letters or emails were sent confirming 111 
interview appointments (and providing a further copy of the participant information sheet) 112 
one week prior to interviews, with reminder phone calls, or emails, the day before. 113 
Participants were offered a £20 high street shopping voucher as a ‘thank you’ for taking part. 114 
Data collection 115 
ELG conducted interviews in person (n=1) or by telephone (n=20) according to participant 116 
preference. Participants took part in one interview each during working hours. Only the 117 
participant and interviewer were present during interviews.  118 
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Before interviews began, the researcher asked participants to confirm that they had read the 119 
information sheet and if they had any questions. The researcher then asked participants to 120 
complete a written consent form and (during telephone interviews) return this via email.  121 
A semi-structured topic guide shaped interviews (Appendix 1). This was iteratively refined 122 
during interviews to improve question ordering and flow. We sent participants a series of 123 
show cards to be used during interviews (Appendix 2) via email one week before interviews.   124 
Interviews began with general questions concerning the participant’s professional role. Then 125 
the researcher introduced the concept of HPFI, read a definition of HPFI developed from the 126 
peer-reviewed literature[2] from a show card, and asked the participant to provide their 127 
general responses. Next, the researcher read summary information from a recent systematic 128 
review[4] on the effectiveness of HPFI from a show card and asked participants if they had 129 
any specific responses to this ‘evidence’. Next, the researcher read out three examples of 130 
HPFI schemes from show cards and asked participants about the barriers and facilitators to 131 
introducing such schemes - both in general and from the specific perspective of their current 132 
position. All of the example schemes were based on, or adapted from, real scenarios[21-23] 133 
and were selected to cover a range of different behaviours and HPFI formats. Finally, the 134 
researcher summarised a framework[2] describing different aspects of HPFI design (from a 135 
show card) and asked participants how these aspects of design influenced acceptability.  136 
At the end of interviews, the researcher summarised the key points covered and offered 137 
participants the chance to add to, revise or clarify their views. Transcripts were not returned 138 
to participants for checking and they were not asked to provide feedback on the results. 139 
Data analysis 140 
With consent, all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis 141 
alongside any interviewer reflections. We used Framework Analysis[24] to analyse 142 
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transcripts. We developed an initial framework based on preliminary analyses of concepts 143 
from interviews and the results of our previous work on acceptability of HPFI.[14, 15, 25-27] 144 
We then applied this to the data to identify and code pertinent extracts. Extracts that reflected 145 
concepts insufficiently identified by the framework were used to modify the framework. 146 
Thus, we iteratively refined the framework until we had a definitive version that captured all 147 
concepts and offered a coherent, structured, and cohesive account of stakeholders’ views.  148 
The first author (ELG) conducted coding using NVivo software. Frequent discussions with 149 
the project lead (JA), ensured that data interpretation was credible, valid and shared.[28]  150 
Reflexivity 151 
ELG is an experience qualitative researcher[13, 27, 29-31] with a PhD in public health 152 
research. At the time interviews were conducted, she was working as a research associate, 153 
and then senior lecturer, in public health. The research was the final part of a four year 154 
programme of work on HPFI that ELG was employed on. Thus, ELG had an in-depth 155 
knowledge of HPFI. ELG had previously established professional relationships with some, 156 
but not all, of the participants before interviews were conducted.  157 
RESULTS 158 
Twenty two individuals were invited to take part, and 21 interviews were conducted during 159 
May-July 2015. One invitee refused to take part as they had retired. Interviews lasted for 20-160 
47 minutes. Five participants were working at national, 10 at regional, and six at local level 161 
(see Table 1). Nine participants were male. Eight participants worked in a commissioning 162 
role, with some commissioning financial incentives, and others non-financial incentives (or a 163 
combination). Participants’ portfolios covered a range of public health functions and areas.  164 
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Table 1 – participant characteristics 165 
Participant 
ID 
Geographical level of 
current position 
Current portfolio Currently employed in 
a commissioning role 
1 Regional Smoking cessation No 
2 Local Public health Yes 
3 Regional Public health Yes 
4 Regional Alcohol No 
5 Regional Smoking cessation No 
6 Regional Health protection No 
7 National Public health Yes 
8 Local Public health Yes 
9 Regional Public policy No 
10 National Public health Yes 
11 Regional Drugs and alcohol No 
12 Local Sexual health Yes 
13 Local Sexual health Yes 
14 Local Substance misuse Yes 
15 Regional Mental health No 
16 National Health and wellbeing No 
17 Local Public health No 
18 National Unknown Unknown 
19 Regional Health improvement No 
20 Regional Public health No 
21 National Public health No 
 166 
The final coding framework is described in Table 2. The results are described, and illustrated 167 
using verbatim quotes, according to the two main research questions – factors influencing 168 
overall acceptability of HPFI; and what, if anything, could be done to maximise acceptability. 169 
Methods of maximising acceptability were primarily related to format and design of HPFI 170 
schemes and these are described with reference to a previously described framework.[2]  171 
 Acceptability of financial incentives 
10 
 
Table 2 - coding tree 172 
Code Description 
Potential benefits 
Initial motivation HPFI generate initial motivation for healthy behaviours 
Practical considerations 
Effectiveness  Considerations around initial and long-term effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness Considerations around value-for-money 
Monitoring Considerations around ‘gaming’ and how this can be avoided 
Intervention paradigm HPFI do not address the ‘root causes’ of unhealthy behaviours 
Views of others Considerations around how other stakeholders may view HPFI 
Ethical considerations 
Culture of entitlement HPFI create a culture of entitlement 
Discrimination HPFI are discriminatory and divisive 
Incentive design format 
Direction A positive reward or negative penalty 
Form Cash, vouchers, or specific goods and services 
Certainty Certain, uncertain chance, or certain chance 
Magnitude Total value of the incentive 
Recipient Individual, group, significant other, clinician or parent 
‘Other’ issues 
Free coding… … 
 173 
Despite the concerns and issues described below, participants acknowledged that HPFI could 174 
be useful interventions. It was recognised that HPFI could be a “hook” for encouraging 175 
people to adopt healthy behaviours; that HPFI could help more than the individual who 176 
receives the incentive (e.g. unborn children, if HPFI are targeted at pregnant women); and 177 
that they can help to create a culture where healthy behaviours become the norm.  178 
“So the micro, yes it will be better to the individual child, absolutely, and the macro is 179 
if that small trial in turn triggers community changes of behaviour...” [ID: 21] 180 
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Factors influencing HPFI acceptability 181 
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 182 
Many participants discussed the need for robust evidence on the effectiveness and cost-183 
effectiveness of HPFI schemes. The implication being that HPFI could be acceptable if they 184 
were demonstrably effective and cost-effective. Evidence requirements for demonstrating 185 
effectiveness were high with, for example, a demand for evidence of effects sustained beyond 186 
12 months follow up and discussion about the potential selection bias of existing studies. It is 187 
not clear if this standard of evidence is required for all potential interventions, or if this was 188 
driven by an underlying cautiousness about HPFI in particular. The systematic review 189 
evidence presented in the show card did not appear to change many views towards HPFI.  190 
“I think we’ll be much more open as a Public Health community to using incentives, 191 
but at the moment most of what I’ve seen has been maximum of kind of a year follow-192 
up.” [ID:16] 193 
“Well I think inevitably and absolutely unavoidably there is a selection bias in the 194 
people who participate in these studies … I think evidence on individual level 195 
behaviour change of any sort is making a biased comparison.” [ID:18] 196 
The current context of public sector austerity in England appeared to drive a particular 197 
interest in cost-effective, and even cost-saving, public health interventions.  198 
“I think the, you know, obviously the biggest factor is the question of how effective 199 
they are and whether they are cost-effective [and] cost-saving…” [ID: 02] 200 
“It’s much easier to make an argument, as I was saying earlier, where you can 201 
demonstrate a cost-saving element to what’s being done rather than an additional 202 
cost in order to encourage the behaviour.” [ID: 02] 203 
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Monitoring and avoidance of ‘gaming’ 204 
Participants raised concerns about ‘gaming the system’ – where individuals lie about their 205 
behaviour in order to gain rewards that they are not entitled to. This led to discussions about 206 
whether health behaviours could ever be monitored well enough to ensure that all gaming 207 
was identified. There appeared to be concerns that monitoring and avoiding gaming would 208 
place such heavy demands on schemes that they would become unworkable. 209 
“I think it’s any scheme is open to misuse and I think you will always get the edited 210 
version from somebody and some of it is the hard measured stuff is obviously far more 211 
robust.” [ID:13] 212 
Intervention paradigm 213 
Some participants felt that HPFI failed to address the root causes of unhealthy behaviours. In 214 
particular, HPFI were identified as individual-level (rather than population-level) 215 
interventions that fail to change the context in which behaviours are performed. For this 216 
reason, HPFI were identified as a “sticking plaster”, rather than a longer term solution. Thus 217 
HPFI were identified as reinforcing a flawed focus on individual, rather than environmental 218 
and social, determinants on health behaviours. 219 
“I think they may have a part to play but I’m very concerned that the vast majority of 220 
the activities that we see taking place in relation to lifestyle behaviours are focused on 221 
trying to change the behaviour of individuals rather than trying to change the 222 
environment.” [ID:18] 223 
 “… you’d like to think that adults could be better educated earlier on in say the 224 
schooling years to become aware of healthier options, healthier choices. And that 225 
would in my view be a more effective, more strategic approach to the problem than 226 
the short-term sticking plaster [of incentives].” [ID:21] 227 
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Views of other stakeholders 228 
Participants were often concerned about how other key stakeholders would perceive HPFI. 229 
These included: elected politicians, the wider public, recipients of HPFI, and the media. 230 
There was a strong feeling that all of these stakeholders would have to find HPFI acceptable 231 
before they could be implemented.  232 
“…we obviously need the buy-in of our partner organisations, of our commission 233 
services … making sure that the [elected, local] Councillors are on board, that you’re 234 
not going to get a negative public backlash, things like that are bit more secondary 235 
but the buy-in is the crucial one.” [ID:08] 236 
“And again, you know, if you get into those large types of things then you’re going to 237 
have a lot more political wrangling and you know, perhaps negative press and things, 238 
so you have to be very careful with it.” [ID:19] 239 
Some responses in relation to more versus less acceptable formats of HPFI (described below) 240 
appeared to relate to perceptions of what would be most acceptable to other stakeholders. For 241 
example, whilst participants believed that recipients of HPFI would value cash more than 242 
voucher rewards, vouchers were perceived to be more acceptable to other stakeholders and so 243 
preferable. Similarly, whilst participants acknowledged that recipients might prefer higher 244 
value rewards, these were felt to be less acceptable to other stakeholders and, hence, smaller 245 
value rewards were preferable overall.  246 
“Again, it’s that balance, isn’t it, what’s the value to the client to make it worthwhile? 247 
So, again, that would be quite interesting to look at. Are they more likely to engage in 248 
positive behaviour if it’s £5 or £10 or whatever? What size incentive is necessary and 249 
I guess we don’t know that really.” [ID:03] 250 
 Acceptability of financial incentives 
14 
 
Ethical concerns 251 
Irrespective of whether HPFI were effective and cost-effective, many participants felt uneasy 252 
with the approach for moral and ethical reasons. Two key concerns were highlighted – that 253 
HPFI may generate a “culture of entitlement” encouraging a belief that healthy behaviours 254 
should be instantly rewarding, and that HPFI discriminate against those who already pursue 255 
healthy behaviours.  256 
“I think there’s a long term risk that you’re generating an instant reward culture for 257 
behaviour change which is quite dangerous actually.” [ID:16] 258 
“… it’s not ethical, you know, I’ve got the, you know, actually we’ve got lots of people 259 
who are already engaged in healthy behaviours and so why should they not be able to 260 
access some incentive for [that] already?” [ID:17] 261 
Maximising acceptability 262 
Direction of incentive – rewards versus penalties and deposit schemes 263 
The majority of participants thought that reward-based incentives were more acceptable than 264 
penalties or deposit schemes. This was mainly because they felt rewards provided a positive 265 
recognition of the effort made by individuals attempting behaviour change.  266 
“I would always favour rewards as opposed to penalties… It’s reinforcing the 267 
positivity of the intervention.” [ID:03] 268 
Deposit schemes were viewed unfavourably by most participants as they were perceived as 269 
excluding large groups who did not have money to spare – often the very groups felt to be 270 
most in need of help to improve their health.  271 
“I think that there’s something very odd about requiring the individual to deposit a 272 
lump sum at the beginning … it would immediately exclude a pretty large part of the 273 
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population we wanted to try and get it to, because they simply wouldn’t have the 274 
money to do that.” [ID:02] 275 
“My initial response was ‘gosh, how middle class’, you know? I can’t imagine any of 276 
the deprived communities that I have worked with directly being able to deposit a 277 
lump sum like that into a scheme and to risk not getting it back.” [ID:05] 278 
Whilst participants generally did not respond well to penalties, these were noted as 279 
potentially effective at encouraging individual motivation. There was also a suggestion that a 280 
penalty deposit scheme could work with deprived communities, if the deposit was made on 281 
behalf of recipients. 282 
 “I think it’s psychologically quite different if I give them that money and they lost it 283 
and got it, you know, this is developing their own internal incentive, and I like that a 284 
lot.” [ID:11] 285 
“I think you could do it with deprived communities in that you could deposit an 286 
amount of money on their behalf and say you know, if you stick to it for this long you 287 
get so much of it …, and as time goes on ultimately they get all of it.” [ID:05] 288 
Form – cash versus vouchers 289 
There was a common view that cash rewards were “more honest” than shopping voucher 290 
rewards and would allow individuals more freedom to use rewards as they chose. Despite 291 
this, cash was generally considered to be unacceptable in practice, because of the potential for 292 
“abuse”: particularly spending reward money on unhealthy products such as tobacco.  293 
“… what you wouldn’t want to give is them you know, £10, £12 to an individual 294 
because they’ve successfully lost weight only for them to potentially go and spend that 295 
money on a box of cigarettes…” [ID:14] 296 
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There was also a view that vouchers would encourage recipients to “save up” rewards to 297 
purchase a larger item, rather than “fritter away” small amounts of cash. 298 
 “… so if you’ve got sort of not hard cash but some other cash equivalent that you can 299 
save up to get something more meaningful, which was our experience of the women in 300 
the scheme.” [ID:05] 301 
Certainty - certain versus uncertain (lottery) rewards 302 
Some participants felt that incentives should be certain – that is, that all potential recipients 303 
should receive a reward if they undertook the behaviour of interest – and not the result of a 304 
lottery for all those doing so. These individuals felt that uncertain rewards were unjust and 305 
potentially demotivating for recipients. 306 
“I just think if I was taking part in something that I’d been promised a reward if I do 307 
A and then actually I don’t get it because of, it’s only a chance, so someone else gets 308 
it, I’d feel that was really unjust and I’d feel cheated.” [ID:05] 309 
Others felt that as long as the chance of winning with a lottery-based HPFI were made 310 
transparent, such approaches were acceptable. 311 
“…so transparency I guess is really important and also the fact that they know the 312 
reward, the chance is there all of the time with lottery and/or they’re going to get a 313 
positive reward each time.” [ID:14] 314 
Magnitude 315 
Overall, participants preferred smaller value rewards – although they were generally unable 316 
to articulate what a small value was. Larger rewards were often considered akin to bribery 317 
and as providing too much temptation to ‘game the system’. Reward value also raised issues 318 
of cost, cost-effectiveness and cost-saving discussed above. 319 
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“Yeah, it would have to be a relatively low value for it to be acceptable.” [ID:03] 320 
“I mean there are massive issues around costs at the moment … so the idea of using 321 
financial incentives in the time of austerity is probably something that we … aren’t 322 
going to get to look at … because at the moment, we’re looking at where we can make 323 
efficiencies.” [ID:17] 324 
Recipients – targeting, and individual versus groups 325 
There was a general feeling that HPFI would be more acceptable if they were targeted at 326 
more vulnerable groups, particularly those living in deprived communities. 327 
“So I think it would be more acceptable for women from deprived communities … If it 328 
was something like that … it would just feel fairer.” [ID:17] 329 
“It feels a little bit better because it’s a targeted intervention so it really is targeting 330 
the deprived community.” [ID:03] 331 
Group-based incentives were considered as useful in fostering peer support, but there was 332 
also a concern that this could lead to some individuals being alienated. 333 
“I quite like the reinforcing nature of that as kind of your reward being partly 334 
dependent on the behaviour of others as part of your team and that being a 335 
reinforcing measure.” [ID:01] 336 
“I think that’s probably fraught with difficulty, so it could work well but equally you 337 
can see how the person who lets his or her behaviour slip is then seen as letting down 338 
the whole group and it could have all sorts of negative consequences.” [ID:18] 339 
DISCUSSION 340 
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This is the first study that we are aware of exploring the acceptability of HPFI to public 341 
health policymakers. Public health policymakers in our sample did not show universal or 342 
overwhelming support for HPFI, despite being provided with systematic review evidence 343 
supporting the effectiveness of HPFI. However, policymakers did acknowledge that HPFI 344 
could be a useful behaviour change tool. Areas of particular concern were doubt over the 345 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of HPFI, uncertainty about whether ‘gaming’ could be 346 
effectively and efficiently identified and prevented, and wariness that HPFI fail to address the 347 
underlying determinants of unhealthy behaviours. Participants also felt uneasy about the 348 
possibility that HPFI create and reinforce an expectation of instant rewards and discriminate 349 
against those who pursue healthy behaviours without financial rewards.  350 
Public health policymakers identified a number of design elements that should be associated 351 
with more acceptable HPFI schemes. These included offering vouchers rather than cash, 352 
rewards rather than penalties, certain rather than lottery-based rewards, smaller value rewards 353 
(although these were not well defined), and incentives targeted at vulnerable groups – 354 
particularly those living in more deprived areas. Participants often seemed to second guess 355 
how other stakeholders, such as elected politicians, the public, and the media, would view 356 
HPFI and were particularly cautious of attracting negative responses from these stakeholders. 357 
Strengths & limitations of methods 358 
Data saturation was achieved after around 19 interviews, indicating that the sample size was 359 
large enough. Qualitative research is not intended to be ‘generalisable’. Instead, validity is 360 
assessed in terms of triangulation and transferability of findings. As little previous research 361 
has explored acceptability of HPFI to policymakers, direct comparisons are not possible. 362 
However, as discussed below, findings were similar to other qualitative studies on the 363 
acceptability of HPFI to other groups.[27] [32] This increases the credibility of our findings. 364 
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We had clear research questions, structured our interview guide around these questions and 365 
report our results in relation to these research questions. Whilst this Framework Approach 366 
ensures that our results clearly reflect our aims, such an approach could be considered 367 
restrictive. We overcame this by using open coding to capture issues not initially anticipated. 368 
Interpretation of findings and comparison to previous results  369 
Participants repeatedly stressed the need for new interventions to be cost-effective or even 370 
cost-saving. Other research has documented public concerns about the potential costs, and 371 
cost-effectiveness, of HPFI.[13, 27, 32] However, as far as we are aware, this is the first time 372 
cost-saving has been raised and this reflects the current climate of austerity and public sector 373 
cuts in English local government (where public health services are currently located). There 374 
is very little evidence concerning cost-effectiveness of HPFI. One recent randomised 375 
controlled trial of incentives of up to £400 (US$567) for smoking cessation during pregnancy 376 
reported a cost per quality-adjusted life-year gained of £482 (US$671).[33] This figure is 377 
well below the current working maximum in England of £20-30,000 (US$28,779-43,168) per 378 
quality adjusted life-year gained,[34] but does not reflect a cost-saving intervention (where 379 
the health-care savings achieved by an intervention outweigh the costs).  380 
Although we provided participants with a summary of evidence from a recent systematic 381 
review on the effectiveness of HPFI,[4] this appeared to have little influence on their views. 382 
This may because we introduced the evidence summary after we had invited participants to 383 
give their general reflections on HPFI: participants may have felt the evidence summary 384 
undermined the views they had already voiced. Alternatively, as peer-reviewed literature is 385 
only one type of ‘evidence’ that public health policymakers consider, [35, 36] the other issues 386 
and concerns identified by participants may have been as, or more, important influences on 387 
their views than a systematic review. Some participants were critical of the existing research  388 
 Acceptability of financial incentives 
20 
 
on HPFI – identifying selection bias and lack of long term follow-up as particular problems. 389 
This may explain their concerns about lack of effectiveness. Alternatively, underlying 390 
disquiet about HPFI may have led participants to be hyper-critical of research evidence. 391 
As previously,[13, 15, 27] participants were wary of the potential for ‘gaming’, where 392 
participants lie in order to gain rewards they are not entitled to. In trials of HPFI, little 393 
evidence of gaming has been documented.[37] It is, therefore, not clear if our participants’ 394 
concern was with preventing gaming itself, or with being seen to be preventing gaming. 395 
Previous authors have proposed restricting HPFI to behaviours that can be accurately 396 
measured in order both to prevent gaming and to show that this was being done.[38]   397 
A number of participants identified that HPFI do not address more distal, social, determinants 398 
of health and health behaviours and, as such, are unlikely to lead to sustained behaviour 399 
change. Other authors have expressed similar concerns that HPFI do not address the ‘root’ 400 
causes of unhealthy behaviours.[12] Whilst there is evidence that HPFI can have effects that 401 
last for at least 12 months after intervention withdrawal,[4] longer term effects are not well 402 
documented. It is often suggested that HPFI act as external motivators that ‘crowd out’ 403 
internal motivation meaning effects are unlikely to be sustained once they are withdrawn.[15] 404 
Whilst ‘crowding out’ has been extensively reported in laboratory studies of economic 405 
behaviour,[39] it does not appear to occur in relation to HPFI for health behaviours.[40] 406 
Our finding that policymakers prefer shopping vouchers to cash rewards reflects previous 407 
qualitative work with both members of the public and health care providers.[22, 27, 41] As 408 
previously, we found that participants were particularly concerned about the potential for 409 
recipients to use cash rewards to purchase unhealthy commodities such as tobacco and 410 
alcohol.[27, 42, 43] However, these findings contrast with those of two recent discrete choice 411 
experiments, that collected anonymous on-line data from members of the public, and found 412 
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preferences for cash over voucher incentives.[44, 45] This discrepancy may be reflected in 413 
our participants’ recognition that, whilst recipients of HPFI would likely prefer cash, other 414 
stakeholders may not. Participants appeared to ‘second guess’ the preferences of other 415 
stakeholders, believing that vouchers were politically ‘safer’ than cash.  416 
The preference for designing HPFI to encourage ‘saving up’, rather than ‘frittering away’, 417 
has been reported previously.[46] This may be linked to a conceptualisation of HPFI as 418 
serving dual purposes, particularly when targeted at disadvantaged populations: both as 419 
rewards, and as a tool to improve economic circumstances. Previous research has 420 
documented individual differences in how recipients choose to use HPFI rewards.[46] Clarity 421 
on what purpose HPFI should serve and how much recipients should be restricted in what 422 
they spend them on, may help in designing maximally acceptable HPFI. 423 
Our finding of a strong preference for targeting HPFI at disadvantaged populations has been 424 
reported previously in a qualitative study with members of the public[27] and may reflect a 425 
perception that HPFI may be most effective in more disadvantaged people.[38] Whilst this 426 
makes intuitive sense, there is very limited evidence concerning differential effectiveness of 427 
HPFI by socio-economic status.[4] Furthermore, it is not a universal finding that targeted 428 
HPFI are preferred.[32, 44] An alternative explanation of the preference for targeted schemes 429 
is that these may be considered both cheaper (as fewer people are eligible for rewards), and 430 
more cost-effective (because a higher proportion of people may respond). 431 
Ultimately our interviews with policymakers identified three areas of tension. The first was a 432 
tension between wanting to trust individuals, and designing incentive schemes that promote 433 
individual accountability and responsibility; and an inherent distrust of individuals with 434 
concerns around individuals gaming the system. Secondly, there was a tension between 435 
participants’ own views; and concerns about the possible views of other stakeholders such as 436 
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the public, media and politicians. Thirdly, there was a tension between personal and 437 
professional views on incentives; policymakers sometimes suggested a distaste for HPFI on a 438 
personal level, but could see the value of them from a professional point of view.   439 
Implications for policy, practice and research 440 
Overall, we found that policymakers raised similar concerns about HPFI as other stakeholder 441 
groups.[13, 15, 27] However, policymakers appear to be unique in explicitly considering the 442 
possible views of other stakeholders when considering the acceptability of HPFI.  443 
Our results suggest that HPFI would be more acceptable to UK policymakers if there was 444 
further evidence of long-term effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and robust strategies to 445 
explicitly minimise gaming. Schemes that provided shopping voucher rewards, of smaller 446 
value, particularly targeted at deprived group would be most acceptable to policymakers. 447 
Whilst there is limited evidence on the cost-effectiveness of HPFI, there are now a number of 448 
systematic, and other, reviews of effectiveness.[3, 4, 6, 7, 25] Researchers should focus their 449 
efforts on establishing cost-effectiveness and communicating results to policymakers. 450 
Given participants’ concerns with others’ views on HPFI, there may be a need for further 451 
qualitative work to uncover the views of these groups. Research suggests that media coverage 452 
of HPFI in the UK is generally overall balanced, or favourable,[47] and policymakers could 453 
be reassured of this. Effective communication of the results of existing research on 454 
acceptability of HPFI may help policymakers understand key areas of concern and how these 455 
could be overcome. 456 
CONCLUSIONS 457 
Public health policymakers working in England acknowledged that HPFI could be useful 458 
behaviour change tools, but were not overwhelmingly supportive of these interventions. They 459 
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raised particular concerns about effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, potential ‘gaming’, and 460 
whether or not HPFI address the underlying causes of unhealthy behaviours. Shopping 461 
voucher rewards, of smaller value, targeted at deprived groups were most acceptable. 462 
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE 639 
Introductions, information, questions, & consent 640 
Initial responses to generic concept of financial incentives for healthy behaviours  641 
Reaction to information on effectiveness of financial incentives for healthy behaviours 642 
Specific examples of financial incentives for healthy behaviours  643 
Example 1: breastfeeding  644 
Example 2: smoking in pregnancy   645 
Example 3: weight loss 646 
Aspects of design of financial incentives for health behaviours 647 
Close and thank you  648 
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APPENDIX 2 – TEXT OF SHOW CARDS 649 
Show card 1 650 
A definition of financial incentives: “cash or cash-like rewards or penalties provided to, or 651 
imposed on, individuals contingent on their performance of healthy behaviours” 652 
Show card 2 653 
Recent systematic review evidence: “We conducted a systematic review of controlled 654 
evaluations of the effectiveness of financial incentive interventions, compared to no 655 
intervention or usual care, to encourage healthy behaviour change, in non-clinical adult 656 
populations, living in high-income countries. On average, incentives were 2.5 times more 657 
effective than usual care for smoking cessation in the short term (<6 months) and 1.5 times as 658 
effective in the longer term. Financial incentives were 1.9 times more effective than usual 659 
care for encouraging people to attend for vaccination or screening. Overall, incentives were 660 
1.6 as effective as usual care in encouraging uptake of healthy behaviours.” 661 
Show card 3 662 
Example 1, breastfeeding: “A local authority in Yorkshire has low breastfeeding initiation 663 
and maintenance rates. New mothers are offered £200 in cash if they are still doing any 664 
breastfeeding at 6 months. Peer supporters continue to provide normal health, advice and 665 
support. This example is based on a pilot scheme being evaluated by researchers at the 666 
University of Sheffield.” 667 
Show card 4 668 
Example 2, smoking in pregnancy: “A region in Scotland has high rates of smoking in 669 
deprived, pregnant women. Pregnant women are offered cessation support from community 670 
pharmacies. They set a quit date and then return weekly for support over 12 weeks. Each 671 
week that they return and provide a smoke-free breath test they are rewarded with £12.50 in 672 
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supermarket vouchers. This example is based on the ‘Give it up for baby’ programme in 673 
Tayside, Scotland.” 674 
Show card 5 675 
Example 3, weight loss: “A local authority on the south coast of England has high overweight 676 
and obesity rates. They commission an online weight loss and maintenance service that 677 
provides weight loss resources and incentives. Participants are provided with an 678 
individualised health weight loss plan and supervised weigh-ins take place monthly. 679 
Participants deposit a lump sum at the start of the programme and receive a proportion of this 680 
back each month for every pound that they lose – up to a maximum of £425 over one year. 681 
This example is based on the ‘Pounds for pounds’ programme in Kent.” 682 
Show card 6 683 
1. Reward or penalty/deposit contract 684 
2. Cash or shopping vouchers or specific ‘prizes’ 685 
3. Total value 686 
4. Everyone eligible receives reward/penalty, or lottery to determine who receives 687 
5. Reward/penalty for doing something that should help people adopt healthier behaviours 688 
(e.g. attending a health promotion session) or for actually adopting healthier behaviours (e.g. 689 
taking more steps per day) 690 
6. All instances of healthy behaviours rewarded/penalised or only some instances 691 
7. Fixed reward/penalty or escalating schedule – the longer you stick to the programme, the 692 
higher the reward 693 
8. Reward/penalty given to individuals or groups of individuals working together 694 
